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Abstract:  
 
Socio-political instability is considered as an obstacle for economic and social development 
of countries. Therefore, Political violence as a feature of socio-political instability is a 
significant development constraint that generates economic problems, limits public and 
private investments, and damages the country’s infrastructure. 
 
This paper offers an explanation for political violence and economic development through an 
empirical analysis of Colombian departments that includes factors such as social conditions 
and narcotrafficking.  
 
We use multiple datasets to measure political violence and economic development, and we 
employ panel fixed-effects Driscoll and Kraay regressions and Generalized Method of 
Moments Estimation (GMM) for a sample of Colombian departments over the period 2000-
2014.  
 
In the political violence model, we find that the aggregate-level production per capita, 
education, arrests and health coverage have a negative effect on political violence, whereas 
GINI, unemployment rate, illegal drugs and displaced population have a positive effect on 
violence. In the economic development model, political violence, armed actions and 
corruption have a negative effect on economic development, whereas population, saving, 
employment, political participation, manufacturing and production have a positive effect on 
economic development.  
 
The findings demonstrate the importance of implementing social policies and strategies 
against political violence to increase economic growth and development, productivity, 
political participation and security for the population across Colombia’s departments. 
 
Keywords: Economic development, socio-political instability, political violence, social 
conditions, Panel Data, Colombia. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent literature suggests that a measurement of socio-political instability relate 
political violence as an approach (Linke, Schutte, Buhaug, 2015). Some studies have 
worked socio-political instability as measures of government stability, social unrest, 
and political violence (Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, 2005). Several researches to have 
demonstrated that economic and socio-political stability are essential requirements 
to achieve effective economic development. Political violence is recognised as a 
cause of economic decline and political instability that undermines the development 
and social conditions of a population through its destructive effects on human, 
natural and physical capital in a region, Detges (2017). In several developing 
countries, the extreme deprivation and oppression, high levels of inequality and poor 
social conditions and development are triggered by irregular armed groups that have 
sought to achieve political power through violence (Bodea and Elbadawi, 2008; 
Moser and Clark, 2001). 
 
Several studies in the last year have suggested that economic growth and 
development determine the opportunity cost of peace, institutional state of the 
country and the risk of political violence (Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2019). Moreover, the 
economic growth and development linked to political violence are themselves 
endogenous to the economic and political institutions that govern the management of 
the political processes and economic activities in a society (Magesan and  Leong, 
2018). Furthermore, these institutions are influenced by social and cultural features 
(Bodea and Elbadwi, 2007; Rodrik et al., 2004; Sambanis, 2004). 
 
Violence and criminal activity have been analysed using multiple approaches. From 
the economic theory of crime, Becker (1968) suggested that criminal acts are the 
result of rational decisions based on a cost-benefit analysis that includes the loot and 
the opportunity cost of the crime in the form of the penalties imposed to apprehend 
criminals. This theory predicts that a greater possibility of earning an income by 
legal means and an increase in law-abidingness would decrease the incentives to 
participate in criminal activities and would thus reduce violence. In criminology, 
Cohen and Felson (1979) proposed the routine activities theory, which asserts that 
three requirements are necessary for a crime to occur: a motivated offender, a 
suitable target, and the absence of capable guardians. Hence, if any of these 
requirements is lacking, a crime will not occur. Blau (1977) and Blau and Blau 
(1982) argued that heterogeneity and patterns of inequality in social relations 
influence the observed crime rates.  
 
Therefore, variations in the rate of violence are the result of inequalities in the socio-
economic conditions. These theories demonstrate that the causes and effects of 
violence are varied and depend on different processes such as economic, political 
and social conditions. Messner and Rosenfeld (1996), Messner and Rosenfeld 
(1999), Messner and Rosenfeld (2006) and Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) proposed 
the Institutional-Anomie Theory where crime results from the intersection of 
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particular cultural and structural features of a society. Therefore, a society with high 
levels of crime is characterised by the supremacy of the economy relative to non-
economic institutions; the fundamental values of the culture emphasise an egoistic 
form of individualism, and the social norms fail to have much restrictive power on 
the choice of the means of action.  
 
In developing countries, political violence has increased in recent decades. The main 
root causes include poverty, inequality and declining economic growth and state 
capability. Generally, violence is more severe in poorer countries with low per capita 
incomes and slow economic growth generate the negative effects on investment, 
economic development and a lack of opportunity for the population. Nafziger and 
Auvinen (2002) analysed various factors that affect conflict and political violence in 
developing countries, demonstrating that declining incomes, poor economic 
performance, inequality, competition for natural resources and a decaying state are 
the sources of conflict and political violence. Besley and Persson (2011) studied 
political violence with regard to institutional and economic factors. Economic 
shocks, political institutions and natural resources affect the levels of conflict and 
political violence. Blattman and Miguel (2010) examined political violence in 
different contexts, finding that low incomes, weak state institutions, political 
grievances, abundant resources and social divisions are drivers of conflict and 
violence, especially in less developed countries.   
 
Political violence has been studied in various contexts using different approaches. 
Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005) analysed socio-political instability and economic 
growth by applying several econometric techniques on a panel of countries over a 
30-year period. Their results demonstrated that in low-income countries, political 
violence has significant and negative effects on economic growth, and in developing 
countries, preventing and/or eliminating violence is important for economic growth. 
Collier and Rhoner (2008) studied democracy, development and conflict using an 
empirical approach, indicating that the level of income in a society determines how 
prone it is to political violence, and in low-income countries, democracy needs to be 
accompanied by socio-economic policies that strengthen security. Miljkovic and 
Rimal (2008) analysed political instability and socio-economic factors using a panel 
data model, demonstrating that several socio-economic factors, including income 
growth rate, initial income level, and the nature of the political regime, affect 
political instability. Pin (2009) examined the causal impact of political instability on 
economic growth using a dynamic panel system, Generalised Method of Moments 
model, suggesting that economic growth has a causal impact on political violence. 
However, these studies have not analysed the relationship between political violence 
and economic development.   
 
Political violence in Colombia has been analysed by several researchers. Deas 
(1997) showed that some at some points in Colombian history, armed conflict has 
had a strong political component, but in recent decades, the violence has neither 
been revolutionary nor political. Brauer et al. (2004) studied political violence using 
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time series and decomposition techniques and found that the cyclical component of 
Colombia’s violence strongly coincides with the country’s political events. Tate 
(2001) analysed political violence carried out by paramilitary groups and determined 
that these illegal groups are responsible for major drug trafficking operations and the 
majority of the political violence in Colombia. Waldman (2007) analysed political 
violence while accounting for cultural factors. He finds that economic factors and 
the socio-cultural features of Colombian society may explain political violence in 
this country. Moser (2000) suggested three categories of violence for the study of 
violence in Colombia using a method that is both conceptually and operationally 
integrated: 
  
(i) Political violence comprises violent acts motivated by the wish, either 
conscious or unconscious, to obtain or maintain political power. This 
category includes guerrilla conflict, paramilitary conflict, political 
assassinations, and armed conflict between political parties. The proper 
strategy to control this category of violence involves peace negotiations.  
(ii) Economic violence comprises violent acts motivated by the desire, either 
conscious or unconscious, for economic gain or to obtain or maintain 
economic power. Its manifestations are the following: street crime, 
carjacking, robbery or theft, narcotrafficking, kidnapping, and assaults 
during economic crimes. The control of this category of violence 
implies the design of social policies that address topics such as the 
labour market, social opportunities and inclusivity.  
(iii)  Social violence involves violent acts motivated by the wish, either 
conscious or unconscious, for social gain or to obtain or maintain social 
power. This category of violence includes interpersonal violence such as 
spousal and child abuse, the sexual assault of women and children, and 
arguments that become violent. However, studies on the relationship 
between political violence and economic development in Colombia are 
limited by their empirical approaches and the variables for political 
violence that they employ such as social conditions, narcotrafficking and 
arrests for political violence.  
 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to contribute a better explanation of 
political violence that is defined as acts that involve strong and are made by 
private persons or groups with two objectives: 
  
(i) Destruction of the current political and social system with the aim to replace 
by another better in theory.  
(ii) Destruction of the dominant political regime with the aim to replace by 
another. Therefore, the purposes of political violence are the following 
to maintain, modify, substitute or destroy of the state or society model. 
This type of violence involves also acts to destroy or suppress a human 
group with an identity within society by social, political, ethnic, racial, 
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religious, cultural or ideological affinity (Moser and Clark, 2001; 
Moser, 2000).  
 
To analysize political violence, we apply an empirical approach using several 
variables of development and social conditions of population for Colombia’s 
departments. The paper contributes to the literature by analysing political violence 
and economic development using a sample from a developing country (Colombia), 
which is characterised by a stable democratic government and little racial or 
religious conflict. However, this country has experienced armed conflict for decades, 
which has generated high rates of violence. Political violence in Colombia is 
committed by a variety of irregular armed actors, as a result of a dangerous 
combination of narcotrafficking, guerrillas and paramilitary forces that operate in the 
name of social justice and democracy but seek only economic power (Sweig, 2002). 
Moreover, unlike previous studies, the model applied in this study includes social 
conditions, arrests and drug trade variables to determine the relationship between 
political violence and economic development using an empirical approach.   
 
2. Data and methodology 
 
2.1 Data 
 
This paper uses Colombia as a case study. Colombia has 32 sub-national political 
territories called departments. We use data published by the National Police of 
Colombia, the Colombian defence ministry, the DNP (National Planning 
Department), the Colombian Treasury Ministry, the DANE (Colombian Department 
of Statistics), the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences, 
Conflict Analysis Resource Center (CERAC), the database of lethal political 
violence from IEPRI (Institute of Political Studies and International Relations), 
CINEP (Centre of Research and Popular Education), the Office of the Attorney 
General of Colombia, the Office of the Inspector General of Colombia, the Office of 
the Controller General of the Republic of Colombia, the National Civil Registry, and 
the Illicit Crop Monitoring System in Colombia (SIMCI) of the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime. We construct panel data at the Colombian department 
level to analyse political violence. The analysis is performed for the period 2000-
2014. 
 
2.2 Methodology 
 
The models proposed in this paper to analyse political violence and economic 
development are as follows: The model for political violence in equation 1: 
 
     (1)                                 
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where PV represents political violence; PO is the population of a department; 
GDPpc is the aggregate-level production per capita by department; EDU represents 
education variables such as primary and secondary education coverage by 
department; BE is the budget execution by department; ID represents variables 
pertaining to illegal drugs, such as hectares under drug cultivation by department; 
GINI is a measure of income inequality by department; LM represents the relevant 
characteristics of the labour market, such as the unemployment rate; DP is the 
displaced population in a department; HC represents health coverage; and CAP is 
the number of arrests or apprehensions for each Colombian department i in period t.  
 
The sign before a variable signals its expected effect on political violence. Such a 
formulation is in line with the general economic literature on violence (e.g., Becker 
(1968), Durkheim (1982), Fajnzylber et al. (2002), Besley and Persson (2011), 
OECD (2009)). The hypotheses tested in this model are as follows: departments with 
higher populations, hectares under drug cultivation, inequality, unemployment rates 
and displaced populations increase political violence, whereas departments with 
higher levels of GDPpc, education, budget execution, health coverage and arrests 
decrease political violence. The model for economic development in equation 2:   
 
        (2) 
                                                       
where GDPpc is the aggregate-level production per capita by department; PV 
represents political violence; PO is the population of a department, SAV represents 
saving by department; MP is manufacturing production by department; CP 
represents construction production by department; ER represents the relevant 
characteristics of the labour market such as the employment rate; PP is political 
participation by department; ARC are armed actions perpetrated by illegal armed 
groups of a department; and CO is a measure of corruption for each Colombian 
department i in period t. The sign before a variable signals its expected effect on 
economic development, according to literature on this topic (Collier et al., 2003; 
Solimano, 2004; Bodea and  Elbadwi, 2007; Banerjee et al., 2011). The hypotheses 
tested in this model are as follows: departments with higher political violence, armed 
actions and corruption will show lower economic development, whereas 
departments with higher populations, saving, manufacturing and construction 
production, employment rates and political participation will show higher economic 
development.     
 
To examine political violence and economic development and their relationships 
with social conditions and narcotrafficking, we employ a panel data model with 
department-specific fixed effects with the aim of capturing all of the characteristics 
specific to each department (e.g., the level of development or economic growth). 
This type of model is used because it is capable of accounting for the effects of 
unobserved elements (Green, 2011; Wooldridge, 2010; Baltagi, 2008; Arellano, 
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2003; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Hsiao, 2003). Unobserved elements are variables 
that characterise the particular units or individuals in an analysis that cannot be 
measured and therefore cannot be included in the regression model. Moreover, a 
fixed-effects model helps solve the correlation problem because it can control for 
various unobservable influences on political violence and economic development 
across departments and over time (Däubler, 2006; Hanchane and Mostafa, 2010). 
Furthermore, to control for department-specific and time-invariant unobservable 
influences on the Colombian departments, a time fixed effects test indicates that no 
time fixed effects are needed, whereas an entities fixed effects test indicates that 
entities fixed effects are required. 
 
Equations (1) and (2) show the basic framework of a model that accounts for 
unobserved elements, where  are individual or heterogeneous effects and  are 
disturbance terms. In the models proposed in this study, the heterogeneous or 
unobserved effects of the units are particular and intrinsic factors of each department 
that affect social, economic and political conditions.  
 
3. Results 
 
This section provides the estimates from the basic fixed-effects model and the fixed 
effects model using Driscoll and Kraay standard errors. This model was used to 
correct the heteroskedasticity problem and the cross-sectional dependence found in 
the models in the Wald and Wooldridge tests. However, the results of the two 
estimations present the same coefficients and trends in political violence and 
economic development as well as their relationships with social conditions, 
narcotrafficking and arrests. The results suggest that political violence and economic 
development depend on various factors. First, population, inequality, the 
unemployment rate and displaced population have a positive effect on political 
violence, whereas GDPpc, education and arrests have a negative effect on political 
violence. Second, population, department saving and employment rate have a 
positive relationship with economic development, whereas political violence and 
armed actions have a negative relationship with economic development (see tables 1 
and 2). These results confirm the hypotheses suggested in this study on the trends of 
political violence and economic development in Colombian departments.     
 
The tests performed on the estimated residuals from the fixed-effects models show 
heteroskedasticity and Cross-Sectional Dependence problems. To correct these 
problems, the model is estimated again using Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard 
errors and implemented by Hoechle (2007). This estimation accounts for 
heteroskedasticity and Cross-Sectional Dependence problems. Moreover, this option 
allows for the correction of any degree of auto-correlation. Tables 1 and 2 show the 
corrected estimation results using fixed effects with Driscoll and Kraay standard 
errors. 
 
 Economic Development, Political Violence and Socio-Political Instability in Colombia: An 
Econometric Analysis Using Panel Data   
244 
i. Economic development: In this model, economic development is measured by 
GDP per capita. The results show that political violence, armed actions and 
corruption undermine economic development, whereas higher population, saving, 
employment rate, political participation, and manufacturing and construction 
production encourage economic development. Table 1 presents the results of the 
model. These results confirm our proposed hypothesis and concur with the results of 
Bechetti et al. (2011), who demonstrated that political violence, corruption and low 
social capital production have negative consequences for economic development. 
 
Political violence and armed actions have negative and significant effects on 
economic development. Departments with higher political violence and armed 
actions have lower economic development. An unproductive economy, political 
deterioration and the presence of political violence interact in several ways: 
economic and political factors contribute to violence, while violence has an adverse 
effect on economic growth and political development (Nafziger and Auvinen, 2002). 
Moreover, Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development recognised 
that armed violence and conflict impede the realisation of the Millennium 
Development Goals. Conflict prevention and resolution, reduced violence, respect 
for human rights, good government performance and peace-building are crucial 
steps towards reducing poverty, promoting economic growth and development and 
improving the welfare of the population. Therefore, states should make the reduction 
of armed violence a priority in their national development plans. They should ensure 
full compliance with existing and emerging norms and agreements to reduce and 
prevent violence, seek resolutions to conflicts, and enhance peace-building efforts to 
increase economic growth and development and the welfare of the population 
(UNDP, 2006). 
 
Population has a positive and significant effect on economic development. Several 
studies have demonstrated that population growth is likely to exert a positive net 
impact on economic development in many third world countries because it creates a 
large potential labour force (Simon, 1981). 
 
Saving has a positive effect on economic development. Departments with higher 
saving have higher economic development. Several economists have demonstrated 
that a higher savings rate leads to higher economic growth and development because 
high savings leads to increased investment through a more efficient allocation of 
resources. In turn, this efficient allocation helps to improve the standard of living 
because the population has more job opportunities and greater prosperity, which 
translates to higher economic development (Robinson, 1933; 1962; 1967; Sen, 1961; 
Kaldor, 1954; Kaldor and Mirrless, 1962).   
 
Manufacturing and construction production have a positive relationship with 
economic development. Manufacturing and construction play an important role in 
the attainment of sustained economic growth and development because these 
activities contribute to economic activity through construction in new or revitalised 
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cities and towns, improvements in infrastructure, higher production and business 
opportunities, a stable labour market and increased welfare for the population 
(Kelley and Harrison, 1990; Guisan, 2008).     
 
The employment rate has a positive effect on economic development. Economic 
growth is a fundamental requirement for the development of a country, and this 
growth is accomplished by people. Therefore, a labour market must create an 
efficient economy and increase competitiveness and sustainable employment with 
the aim of achieving full and productive employment for the population, which is a 
key factor in the creation of economic growth and development. 
 
Political participation is positively related to increased economic development. 
Several studies have demonstrated that economic development leads to higher levels 
of citizen participation because economic development leads to clusters of social 
changes that will drastically alter the class, organisational, cultural, and social 
structures of a nation, and these changes are associated with new forms of political 
participation (Nie et al., 1969; Muller, 1997; Shi, 2004; Feng et al., 2011).   
 
Corruption has a negative effect on economic development, Sierra and Vargas 
(2015). Corruption is a problem that affects the social, political and economic 
processes in a society (Cotte and Lancheros, 2015). Economic development is 
affected by this phenomenon, mainly due to the decline in foreign direct investment 
resulting from higher transaction costs and motivated by multifarious bureaucratic 
processes for soliciting bribes (Podobnik et al., 2008; UNODC, 2011; Banerjee et 
al., 2011).  
 
Table 1. Fixed effects regression with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors 
estimations of GDP per capita 
 
Parameter 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Fixed 
Effects 
FE 
Driscoll 
and 
Kraay 
Fixed 
Effects 
FE 
Driscoll 
and 
Kraay 
Fixed 
Effects 
FE 
Driscoll 
and 
Kraay 
Fixed 
Effects 
FE 
Driscoll 
and 
Kraay 
Fixed 
Effects 
FE 
Driscoll 
and 
Kraay 
Fixed 
Effects 
FE 
Driscoll 
and 
Kraay 
Constant 
 1.470 a 
(0.36) 
 1.470 a 
(0.44) 
  1.483 a 
 (0.36) 
  1.483 a 
 (0.47) 
  1.325 a 
 (0.36) 
  1.325 b 
 (0.57) 
  1.363 a 
 (0.39) 
  1.363 b 
 (0.55) 
  1.466 a 
 (0.41) 
  1.466 b 
 (0.64) 
 1.012 b 
(0.47) 
 1.012  
(1.21) 
Political  
violence 
-0.037 a 
(0.00) 
-0.037 a 
(0.01) 
-0.034 a 
(0.00) 
-0.034 a 
(0.00) 
-0.036 a 
(0.00) 
-0.036 a 
(0.01) 
-0.036 a 
(0.00) 
-0.036 a 
 (0.00) 
-0.033 a 
(0.00) 
-0.033 a 
(0.01) 
-0.024 b 
(0.01) 
-0.024 c 
(0.01) 
Population 
 0.854 a 
(0.02) 
 0.854 a 
(0.03) 
 0.845 a 
(0.02) 
 0.845 a 
(0.04) 
 0.854 a 
(0.02) 
 0.854 a 
(0.04) 
 0.855 a 
(0.02) 
  0.855 a 
 (0.04) 
 0.852 a 
(0.02) 
 0.852 a 
(0.04) 
 0.798  a 
(0.02) 
 0.798  a 
(0.05) 
Saving 
 0.041 a 
(0.01) 
 0.041   
(0.02) 
 0.043 a 
(0.01) 
 0.043 c 
(0.02) 
 0.022  
(0.01) 
 0.022  
(0.03) 
 0.021  
(0.01) 
  0.021  
 (0.03) 
 0.016  
(0.01) 
 0.016  
(0.03) 
  0.121 a 
(0.02) 
 0.121  c 
(0.02) 
Manufacturing 
production 
 0.033  
(0.03) 
 0.033  
(0.02) 
 0.030  
(0.03) 
 0.030  
(0.02) 
 0.039  
(0.03) 
 0.039  
(0.02) 
 0.037  
(0.03) 
  0.037  
 (0.02) 
 0.035  
(0.03) 
 0.035  
(0.02) 
 0.035  
(0.03) 
 0.035  
(0.02) 
Construction 
production 
  
 
  
 
 0.042 c 
(0.02) 
 0.042  
(0.02) 
 0.043 c 
(0.02) 
 0.043c 
(0.02) 
 0.042 
(0.02) 
  0.042 
 (0.02) 
 0.042 
(0.02) 
 0.042 
(0.02) 
 0.071 c 
(0.04) 
  0.071  
(0.06) 
Employment   
rate 
      0.051  
 (0.03) 
  0.051  
 (0.03) 
  0.051  
 (0.03) 
  0.051  
 (0.03) 
  0.054 c  
(0.03) 
 0.054 c  
(0.03) 
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Political 
Participation 
      
 
   
 
  0.022 
 (0.08) 
  0.022 
 (0.07) 
  0.010 
(0.08) 
 0.010 
(0.06) 
  
Armed 
actions 
        -0.011  
(0.01) 
-0.011  
(0.00) 
 -0.035 
b 
(0.01) 
 -0.035 a 
(0.01) 
Corruption 
          -0.016  
(0.01) 
-0.016  
(0.01) 
F model 
306.57 
0.00 
234.18 
0.00 
247.32 
0.00 
198.73 
0.00 
207.02 
0.00 
189.08 
0.00 
176.90 
0.00 
208.87 
0.00 
152.75 
0.00 
180.86 
0.00 
173.61 
0.00 
173.61 
0.00 
F-test for OLS vs. FE       F(22, 105) = 357.61 (Reject OLS) 
Hausman test* 
82.89 
0.00 
 79.06 
0.00 
 83.02 
0.00 
 79.39 
0.00 
 97.50 
0.00 
 53.17 
0.00 
 
Wald test 
3575.49 
0.00 
 3765.66 
0.00 
 5359.31 
0.00 
 5779.95 
0.00 
 6924.75 
0.00 
 1370.11 
0.00 
 
Wooldridge test 
83.19 
0.00 
 81.16 
0.00 
 78.26 
0.00 
 85.87 
0.00 
 84.78 
0.00 
 162.73 
0.00 
 
No. Obs 325 325 325 325 324 324 324 324 320 320 135 135 
Note: Figures in the parentheses are standard errors. a Significant at the 1% level, b 
Significant at the 5% level, c Significant at the 10% level. *If Prob>chi2 is < 0.05 reject 
random effects. 
 
ii. Political violence: Table 2 shows the results for political violence. The results 
show that arrests, education, budget execution, and GDPpc have negative effects on 
political violence. Population, GINI, the unemployment rate and illegal drug 
cultivation have positive effects on political violence (Table 2). These results concur 
with those obtained by Solimano (2004), who discuss the state’s monopoly on 
coercion and force and find political violence to be associated with the state’s failure 
to maintain control.   
 
The variables of economic growth and development, GDPpc and budget execution 
have negative and significant effects on political violence, whereas the GINI index 
has a positive and significant effect. This finding implies that increases in economic 
growth and development are linked with decreases in political violence, but that 
departments with high levels of income inequality exhibit comparatively high 
political violence (Messner et al. (2002). In previous studies, high levels of political 
violence have been shown to cause recessions, impose financial constraints on the 
government, and damage the country’s infrastructure (Li (2006)). Such findings 
agree with our results for the Colombian case.   
 
Table 2. Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), fixed effects regression with 
Driscoll and Kraay standard errors estimations of political violence 
 
Parameter 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Fixed 
Effects 
FE 
Driscoll 
and 
Kraay 
Fixed 
Effects 
FE 
Driscoll 
and 
Kraay 
Fixed 
Effects 
FE 
Driscoll 
and 
Kraay 
Fixed 
Effects 
FE 
Driscoll 
and 
Kraay 
Fixed 
Effects 
FE 
Driscoll 
and 
Kraay 
Fixed 
Effects 
FE 
Driscoll 
and 
Kraay 
Fixed 
Effects 
FE 
Driscoll 
and 
Kraay 
Generalized 
Method of 
Moment 
(GMM) 
Constant 
-1.627 
(2.29) 
-1.627 
(1.71) 
 -1.612 
  (2.29) 
 -1.612 
  (1.72) 
 9.452 a 
(2.95) 
 9.452 a 
(1.45) 
 9.125 b 
(3.65) 
 9.125 a 
(1.69) 
 1.166  
(3.91) 
 1.166  
(3.52) 
 2.711 
(4.11) 
 2.711 
(2.59) 
 1.530 
(4.10) 
 1.530 
(2.97) 
-1.963 
(4.12) 
Population 
 0.937 a 
(0.35) 
 0.937 a 
(0.21) 
  0.944 
a 
 (0.36) 
   0.944 a 
  (0.21) 
 0.596 c 
(0.34) 
 0.596 a 
(0.16) 
 2.256 a 
(0.59) 
 2.256 a 
(0.55) 
 2.209 a 
(0.56) 
 2.209 a 
(0.56) 
  2.067 a  
(0.58) 
 2.067 a  
(0.51) 
 2.282 a  
(0.57) 
 2.282 a 
(0.50) 
  2.713 a 
(0.81) 
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GDP per capita 
-0.609 
(0.37) 
-0.609 b 
(0.25) 
 -0.618 
c 
 (0.37) 
 -0.618 b 
  (0.26) 
-0.396 
(0.35) 
-0.396 c 
(0.20) 
-2.191 a 
(0.65) 
-2.191 a 
(0.59) 
-2,112 a 
(0.62) 
-2,112 a 
(0.53) 
-1.917 a 
(0.64) 
-1.917 a 
(0.55) 
-1.822 a 
(0.64) 
-1.822 a 
(0.55) 
-2.583 b 
(1.03) 
Primary 
education 
coverage 
-0.003 
(0.02) 
-0.003 
(0.03) 
-0.005 
 (0.02) 
 -0.005 
  (0.03) 
-0.032 
(0.02) 
-0.032 c 
(0.01) 
-0.042 c 
(0.02) 
-0.042  
(0.02) 
-0.062 b 
(0.02) 
-0.062 a 
(0.02) 
-0.060 b 
(0.02) 
-0.060 a 
(0.02) 
-0.065 a 
(0.02) 
-0.065 b 
(0.02) 
-0.002  
(0.03) 
Budget  
execution 
-0.189 b 
(0.09) 
-0.189 a 
(0.04) 
-0.193 b 
(0.09) 
 -0.193 a 
  (0.04) 
-0.097 
(0.09) 
-0.097 c 
(0.05) 
-0.193 
(0.13) 
-0.193 b 
(0.09) 
-0.148 
(0.13) 
-0.148 
(0.09) 
-0.151 
(0.12) 
-0.151 
(0.09) 
-0.180 
(0.12) 
-0.180 c 
(0.09) 
       -0.147  
(0.14) 
Hectares under 
drug cultivation 
 0.087 
(0.06) 
 0.087 
(0.08) 
 0.094 
(0.06) 
  0.094 
 (0.08) 
 0.038 
(0.05) 
 0.038 
(0.04) 
 0.028 
(0.64) 
 0.028 
(0.03) 
0.016 
(0.06) 
 0.016 
 (0.03) 
 0.016 
(0.61) 
 0.016 
(0.03) 
 0.053 
(0.06) 
 0.053 c 
(0.03) 
  0.133 c 
(0.07) 
Secondary 
education 
coverage 
  -0.032 
(0.06) 
-0.032 
 (0.04) 
-0.088 
(0.05) 
-0.088 b 
(0.03) 
-0.111 c 
(0.05) 
-0.111 a 
(0.03) 
-0.155 a 
(0.05) 
-0.155 a 
(0.03) 
-0.150 a 
(0.05) 
-0.150 a 
(0.03) 
-0.155 a 
(0.05) 
-0.155 a 
(0.03) 
        -0.06  
(0.03) 
GINI 
     13.79 a 
(2.49) 
 13.79 a 
(2.39) 
 12.91 a 
(3.66) 
 12.91 a 
(3.02) 
6.892 c 
(3.74) 
 6.892 c 
(4.11) 
 10.00 b 
(4.58) 
 10.00 a 
(2.04) 
 11.95 a 
(4.60) 
 11.95 a 
(2.02) 
 2.80  
(5.82) 
Unemployment  
rate 
       0.456 c 
(0.25) 
 0.456 c 
(0.24) 
0.389 c 
(0.23) 
 0.389  
(0.25) 
 0.406 c 
(0.24) 
 0.406 c 
(0.23) 
 0.426 c 
(0.23) 
 0.426 b 
(0.20) 
0.217  
(0.23) 
Displaced 
population 
        0.488 a 
(0.10) 
0.488 a 
(0.16) 
 0.486 a 
(0.11) 
 0.486 a 
(0.15) 
 0.478 a 
(0.10) 
 0.478 a 
(0.16) 
  0.450 a 
(0.10) 
Health  
coverage 
          -0.135 
(0.11) 
-0.135 
(0.15) 
-0.038 
(0.12) 
-0.038 
(0.09) 
 -0.304 c 
(0.16) 
Arrests 
           
 
 -0.323 b 
(0.13) 
-0.323 b 
(0.15) 
 -0.201 b 
(0.09) 
Political 
violence lagged 
one period 
                0.263 a 
(0.10) 
F model 
2.45 
0.03 
36.08 
0.00 
2.09 
0.05 
33.54 
0.00 
6.39 
0.00 
37.49 
0.00 
6.89 
0.00 
25.93 
0.00 
8.97 
0.00 
76.28 
0.00 
8.23 
0.00 
86.77 
0.00 
   8.16 
   0.00 
 56.83 
   0.00 
Sargan test 
0.424 
F-test for OLS vs. FE       F(21, 195) = 3.96 (Reject OLS) 
  Serial 
Correlation: 
Hausman test* 
27.70 
0.00 
 27.01 
0.00 
 48.43 
0.00 
 58.38 
0.00 
 50.16 
0.00 
 50.35 
0.00 
 48.35 
0.00 
 Firs-order:  
0.0029 
Wald test 
273.71 
0.00 
 276.85 
0.00 
 7.7e+28 
0.00 
 400.03 
0.00 
 429.18 
0.00 
 2.2e+31  
0.00 
 284.56 
0.00 
 Second-order: 
0.4069 
Wooldridge test 
8,850 
0.00 
 8.96 
0.00 
 5.824 
0.02 
 4.713 
0.04 
 4.21 
0.05 
 3.949 
0.06 
 3.523 
0.07 
  
No. Obs 284 284 284 284 284 284 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 
 
Note: Figures in the parentheses are standard errors. a Significant at the 1% level, b 
Significant at the 5% level, c Significant at the 10% level. *If Prob>chi2 is < 0.05 reject 
random effects. 
 
The results for population size show a positive correlation with political violence. 
This positive correlation may occur because departments with heterogeneous 
populations have weak social ties, poverty and high population turnover, making 
them more conducive to political violence. This explanation is applied by McCall 
and Nieuwbeerta (2007) to European countries and Schichor et al. (1979) to the U.S. 
 
The results for the number of arrests indicate the importance of the presence of the 
state in reducing political violence. Moreover, political violence reduces social 
investments that alter the development and economic growth of departments, 
decreasing the quality of life and generating more political violence, which concurs 
with the conclusions of Nafziger et al. (2000). 
 
Illegal drugs, measured as hectares under drug cultivation, have a positive influence 
on political violence that is a result of increased cultivation of coca or other illegal 
drugs (Angrist and Kugler, 2007; Hofmann, 2009). Moreover, in Colombia, 
narcotics traffickers have generated a new set of values for Colombian society. This 
 Economic Development, Political Violence and Socio-Political Instability in Colombia: An 
Econometric Analysis Using Panel Data   
248 
process is evinced by the consumerism and loss of institutional legitimacy that were 
reflected in the general lack of state authority suffered in this country in the mid-
1980s and late 1990s. This crisis progressively destroyed any chance of institutional 
intervention because the drug traffickers are opposed to institutional loyalties of any 
kind and demonstrate that anyone can reach power through the use of violence 
(Camacho and Lopez, 2000).  
 
Displaced population has a positive and significant effect on political violence. In 
Colombia, illegal armed groups and their actions against civilians are the primary 
cause of forced displacement that generates higher poverty and inequality, losses in 
welfare conditions, and limited employment opportunities among the displaced 
population. These factors may encourage violence in these vulnerable populations 
(Ibañez and Velez, 2008; Ibañez and Moya, 2010). 
 
Health coverage has a negative effect on political violence, indicating that higher 
rates of health coverage decrease political violence. Hunt (2008) demonstrated that 
political violence has become a key health issue because political violence causes 
increased morbidity and mortality in a population, has significant and long-lasting 
negative health effects on the people and disrupts the provision of adequate health 
services. Political violence seems to persist over time; as soon as some conflicts are 
resolved, new violence erupts elsewhere. 
 
Education, measured as primary and secondary education coverage, shows that an 
increase in education coverage significantly reduces subsequent political violence, 
yielding sizeable social benefits because education should have a significant and 
sizable influence on individual propensities to commit violent acts (Machin and 
Vujic, 2006). According to Lochner (2007), there are four primary reasons that 
education might affect violence:  
(i) education increases wage rates, which increase the opportunity costs of 
violence;  
(ii) education may directly affect the financial rewards of crime;  
(iii) education may alter preferences for risk-taking or patience;   
(iv) education may affect the social networks or peers of individuals.  
 
The unemployment rate has a positive and significant effect on political violence, 
indicating that higher unemployment rates generate increased political violence. 
Unemployment can be a significant feature of the processes leading to violent 
conflict because this situation aggravates the existing stress of idle workers, who 
might suffer from unmet economic expectations, causing them to turn to political 
violence (Piazza, 2006; Cramer, 2010). 
 
These results demonstrate that political violence is closely related to social 
conditions, arrests and economic growth and development. Improved social 
conditions are created by a strong state. Political violence tends to correlate with 
negative variables such as a weak state presence and a lack of effective justice, 
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which concurs with the Colombian case (Chernick and Bailey, 2005). According to 
World Bank (2007), in the context of Latin America, economic growth and 
development are impeded by high levels of violence and insufficient opportunity. 
Therefore, violence increases when the application of justice is weak, economic 
opportunity is scarce, and education and labour market are deficient. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we attempt to explain and analyse political violence and economic 
development and their relationships with the social conditions and the political 
violence using fixed effects on panel data from Colombian departments between 
2000 and 2014. To examine political violence and economic development, we 
employ a panel data model with department-specific fixed effects and fixed effects 
with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors to capture all of the characteristics particular 
to each department (e.g., the levels of development or political violence). 
 
In the political violence model, we find that aggregate-level production per capita, 
education, arrests and health coverage have a negative effect on political violence 
Conversely, GINI, illegal drugs, population, the unemployment rate, and displaced 
population have a positive effect on political violence. Moreover, social conditions 
and narcotrafficking are important factors influencing the trends of political violence 
in the Colombian departments. 
 
In the economic development model, we find that political violence, armed actions 
and corruption have a negative relationship with economic development, whereas 
population, saving, employment rate, political participation, manufacturing and 
construction have positive effects on economic development. These results indicate 
that increases in economic development are associated with decreases in political 
violence and that departments with higher armed actions and corruption exhibit 
comparatively lower economic development. 
 
The results demonstrate that political violence is closely related to social conditions 
and economic development. These features are determined by state presence, and 
political violence tends to correlate with negative variables such as a weak state 
presence and a lack of effective justice. Economic development is impeded by high 
levels of political violence and insufficient opportunities. Therefore, political 
violence increases when the application of justice is weak, economic opportunity 
and political participation are scarce, and education and healthcare are deficient. 
 
The findings demonstrate the importance of implementing social policies and 
strategies to decrease political violence and increase economic growth and 
development, productivity, and security for the population across the Colombian 
departments. These policies and strategies ought to include investments in education 
and increased opportunities in the labour market, and for political participation, 
these should include strengthening the justice system, Morales and Finke (2015), 
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decreasing corruption and generating an effective state presence in all of Colombia’s 
regions.  
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